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SAFETY ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS OF
MUNICIPAL WASTE DISPOSAL DRIVERS
Stephen M. Swartz
University of North Texas
Matthew A. Douglas
University of North Texas

ABSTRACT
The Theory of Planned Behavior was used to study factors useful for predicting Behavioral
Intentions to commit unsafe acts while driving for commercial drivers working for municipal waste
management operations centers. The Theory of Planned Behavior was found to be moderately
effective in predicting behavioral intentions, particularly through the constructs of Attitude and
Perceived Control. Driver perceptions of safety climate, self-assessed personal safety performance,
risk aversion, and attitudes toward behavioral factors associated with engaging in risky behaviors
while operating motor vehicles were studied. Risk aversion and driver perception of their own safety
performance were also useful predictors of intention.

INTRODUCTION
Once a week, employees of the firm responsible
for safely and efficiently removing your
household waste stop at your house, dump your
trash or recycling into their truck, and drive
off. The same thing has happened all your life
and you’ve probably thought little of it. Many
frustrated drivers race around slow-moving or
stopped refuse or recycling trucks every day,
unaware that this action is one of the leading
causes of death for waste management
employees. Despite the common presence of
municipal disposal equipment and people on
our streets, it seems few have sought to
understand the challenging environment in
which they work.

Very little research in waste management
driving safety exists in the academic literature.
Most academic research is focused on the
occupational hazards of employees who work in
hazardous waste management or waste
management facilities (e.g., Akbar-Khanzadeh
& Regent, 1999; Betsinger, Brosseau, & Golden,
2000). Perhaps this trend is justified, but waste
management drivers face a complex driving
environment and more needs to be done to
understand driving safety in this context.
Much reading on waste management driving
safety is found in the trade magazines. Waste
management companies understand the perils
of driving a Waste Management Vehicle (WMV)
and the grim consequences associated with
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unsafe driving. The companies must take
driving safety seriously; the consequences for
poor safety management practices can be very
high. Many companies hold regular safety
meetings, require their drivers to view safety
videos, and put drivers through rigorous initial
and annual driver safety training. Companies
even educate the public about how to drive
around WMVs. Moreover, the National Solid
Waste Management Association (NSWMA)
launched a safety video campaign in 2007. The
episodes of the “Be Safe, Be Proud” campaign
were designed to increase focus on the critical
role of supervisors in influencing safety
(Kilduff, 2007).
The industry’s initiatives to enhance driver
safety are laudable. But how much do we really
know about how the initiatives influence the
safety attitudes and behaviors of waste
management drivers? Companies must
understand how to tailor their safety programs
and practices to influence drivers’ safety
behaviors. In order to accomplish that task,
companies must first understand the attitudes
and behavioral intentions of their drivers.
Simply put, companies must understand what
makes their drivers tick.
Objective, rigorous attitudinal and behavioral
research is difficult, particularly in the driver
safety context. But research in other fields has
provided the tools to assess drivers’ personal
attitudes and behavioral intentions.
Organizational safety climate has been linked
to employees’ safety attitudes and behaviors
(e.g., Zohar, 1980). Furthermore, the Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB) directly assesses
attitudes and their influence on behavior. The
TPB has even been tested in the professional
driving context (Newman, Watson, & Murray,
2004). In addition, a driver’s attitude toward
risk avoidance in general, and confidence in
their own safety skills may affect their decision
making (Forward, 2006; Zuckerman, 2007). An
investigation of these factors might contribute
to an understanding of drivers’ safety behaviors
and can educate safety professionals on the
24
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next steps they must take to improve safety.
The purpose of this study is to assess the
influence of drivers’ perceptions of safety
climate, their propensity to avoid risk, their
assessment of their own safety performance,
and their attitudes on their intentions to
commit unsafe driving actions.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
AND HYPOTHESES
Safety climate is a sub-type of organizational
climate that reveals the shared perceptions of
organizational members concerning the
organization’s safety policies, procedures, and
practices (Reichers & Schneider, 1990; Zohar,
1980). Studies have identified a direct
relationship between safety climate and
behavior (e.g., Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003;
Zohar, 2000). In short, employees develop
beliefs about the company’s actions and
communications related to safety and
internalize attitudes concerning the
consequences of unsafe behaviors. Those
attitudes impact behavioral intentions and
future behavior.
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; Ajzen
1991) also links individual attitudes and
behaviors. It provides a sound framework to
study how an individual’s personal beliefs,
referent beliefs, and control beliefs about
unsafe actions influence his or her behavior.
While the TPB is cited as a complete theory of
human behavior, other factors can influence a
person’s behavior. Two additional factors were
considered in this study: a general aversion to
risky behaviors and individual confidence in
his or her ability to act safety. First, an
individual’s tendency to avoid risk in general
may encourage that person to shy away from
risky driving behavior. Finally, a person’s
attitudes about their ability to avoid an
undesirable outcome (confidence in their
ability to act safely) may influence whether or
not they actually participate in a risky driving
behavior.

The next section introduces the concepts
identified above. Particularly, the safety
climate-behavior relationship, TPB, risk
avoidance, and self-assessed ability concepts
are developed and discussed in the context of
driving safety. The expected relationships are
presented through proposed hypotheses.

Safety Climate and Behavior
Safety climate has been primarily researched
in the manufacturing, energy production, and
health care industries. Many definitions of
safety climate have been proposed. However,
most studies define safety climate as the
shared perceptions of employees concerning
organizational actions and procedures designed
to eliminate or reduce injuries and accidents
(Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005).
Empirical evidence for the safety climatebehavior relationship exists. High levels of
safety climate, such as communication of safety
issues to employees and displays of
management’s commitment to safety, reduce
employee error and improve organizational
safety (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Wills,
Watson, & Biggs, 2006; Zohar, 1980). Despite
disagreement on the number of factors
associated with safety climate, researchers
generally agree that safety climate is best
measured using employees’ perceptions of
management’s attitudes and commitment to
safety, the priority of safety within the
organization (i.e., safety versus productivity),
and the consistency with which safety is
encouraged and practiced (Brown & Holmes,
1986; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997; Flin et al., 2000;
Griffin & Neal, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin,
2003; Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005; Zohar,
1980).
Waste management companies can enact
policies and procedures that have a direct and
positive impact on drivers’ perceptions of
safety climate. Safety climate perceptions
inform drivers of desired driving behaviors and

the consequences of non-compliance with
desired behaviors. Thus, positive perceptions
of carrier safety climate are expected to reduce
the likelihood that drivers plan to engage in
unsafe behaviors.
Hj:

Drivers’ perceptions of company safety
climate are negatively related to
behavioral intentions to commit unsafe
driving actions.

The Theory of Planned Behavior and
Driving Safety
Social scientists have long been interested in
why people act the way they do in various
situations, and the TPB (Ajzen, 1991) addresses
the factors that influence those decisions. The
TPB has become generally accepted as a
powerful tool for understanding human
behavior and is held by some to be a complete
theory of human behavior (Conner & Armitage,
1998). The TPB has been used extensively to
predict aberrant driving behaviors such as
speeding (Elliot, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003;
Elliot, Armitage, & Baughan, 2005; Forward,
2006; Newman, Watson, & Murray, 2004;
Parker et al., 1992; Warner & Aberg, 2006) and
reckless lane changing (Parker, Manstead, &
Stradling, 1995). However, few studies have
applied the TPB in a professional driving
context (see Newman, Watson, & Murray, 2004
for one example).
Predicting behaviors in traffic safety is
difficult. Some research applying the TPB to
driving behaviors has used drivers’ selfreported behavior (Elliot, Armitage, &
Baughan, 2003) and actual behavior (Warner &
Aberg, 2006). However, given the difficulty in
assessing actual behavior, most studies
assessed behavioral intentions (Elliot,
Armitage, & Baughan, 2005; Forward, 2006;
Newman, Watson, & Murray, 2004; Parker et
al., 1992). The inherent critical assumption
holds that drivers will ultimately perform
those behaviors they express intent to perform.

Fall 2008

25

Given this context, the basic TPB model holds
that three main factors will determine a
person’s behavioral intent toward a given
behavior: attitude, subjective norm, and
perceived behavioral control. Behavioral
intentions are indicated by the person’s
likelihood to perform a behavior (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975). Attitudes are based on the
perceived consequences of a behavior and the
likelihood that performing the behavior will
lead to those consequences. Subjective Norm
refers to a person’s generalized belief about
whether important referent persons or groups
think he or she should (or should not) perform
the behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
Perceived behavioral control consists of a
person’s perceptions of factors that facilitate or
inhibit their ability to perform a behavior
(Ajzen, 1991). In other words, perceived
behavioral control refers to whether or not the
person feels that he or she can personally
control the behavior. The TPB is appropriate
for studying traffic safety because some
behaviors, even aberrant behaviors, are
influenced by factors outside the drivers’ direct
control (Haglund & Aberg, 2000).
It is expected that as drivers’ attitudes and
subjective norms reflect acceptance of unsafe
driving actions, the more likely it will be that
drivers will make an unsafe decision (or
commit an unsafe act). Furthermore, the
harder it is to avoid the unsafe behavior, the
more likely it will be for drivers to perform the
behavior. Conversely, if the behavior is
unacceptable to both the individual and others,
and the person believes they can control the
activity, then generally there will be no intent
to commit the action.
H2:

Drivers’ attitudes, subjective norms, and
perceptions of behavioral control
towards unsafe driving actions are
related (positively, positively, and
negatively respectively) to behavioral
intentions to commit those actions.
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Risk Aversion and Self-Assessed Safety
Performance
Two additional factors were considered in this
study: a general aversion to risky behaviors
and individual confidence in his or her ability
to act safety. These were new factors tested for
their interaction with the more traditional
Climate and TPB model constructs. First,
Zuckerman (2007) purported that high
sensation seekers are more likely to engage in
risky driving behaviors than low sensation
seekers. Therefore, an individual’s tendency to
avoid risk in general may encourage that
person to shy away from risky driving behavior.
Items related to this factor were included in
this study in an attempt to account for
individual personal characteristics outside of
the effects of the other TPB factors. In other
words, it is anticipated that when a personality
characteristic like risk aversion is accounted
for, the explanatory power of the TPB model
would be improved. It is anticipated that for
less risk tolerant/more risk averse drivers, the
intent to commit unsafe acts would be lower.
Finally, a person’s attitudes about their ability
to avoid an undesirable outcome (confidence in
their ability to act safely) may influence
whether or not they actually participate in a
risky driving behavior. Forward (2006) found
that drivers with confidence in their own
driving abilities were able to withstand
external pressure to commit risky driving
behaviors. Therefore, this factor was added in
support of our understanding of the role of
safety training programs on the TPB. It is
anticipated that increased safety training
might improve an individuals’ self perceived
skill at operating safely, even under adverse
conditions. A factor was created using items
attempting to measure a drivers’ perception of
how safely they were able to act, when
compared to “typical” drivers. It is proposed
that if a driver has a higher level of self-

assessed safety performance, they would be
less likely to intend to commit unsafe acts.
H3:

Drivers’ risk aversion and safety
assessment are negatively related to
behavioral intentions to commit unsafe
acts.

the-hour (62%) or as a percentage of revenue
(15%). Finally, most drivers have not been
involved in a safety event in the last year
(60%). The other 40% of drivers have been
involved in a “Safety Event” (accident or
received some kind of violation) in the last
year. This could be characterized as a “high
risk” environment.

METHOD
The participants in this study were WMV
drivers from a small southwestern U.S. waste
management company. The company operates
out of four locations in the region and
participants for the study were employees that
operated out of three of the locations. The
participants were attending companymandated safety meetings composed of a
general safety awareness discussion. In this
context the drivers were given a 15 minute pre
sentation on adverse weather/holiday hazards
and then administered the survey immediately
afterward. Of 103 potential respondents, 99
drivers volunteered to complete the survey
(96% response rate). All data collected was
kept strictly anonymous and confidential.

Demographics
Demographic information consists of drivers’
personal characteristics and experience. As
previously mentioned, 99 drivers completed
the survey. Relevant respondent demographics
are presented in Table 1. Approximately 63% of
the drivers are from Location 1, a large
metropolitan pick up and consolidation point.
The other 37% are from Locations 2 (slightly
smaller metropolitan pickup and consolidation)
and 3 (primarily residential pick up). Most of
the drivers classify themselves as fleet drivers
or owner-operators (65% and 14%, respec
tively). A number of drivers did not list their
classification (15%). All respondents are male
(100%) and most are married (71%), with a
large proportion of the respondents between
the ages of 26-50 (approximately 85%). The
majority of the drivers travel between 0-75,000
miles per year (74%). Most drivers are paid by-

TABLE 1
SAMPLE PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS (N= 99)
Age (years)
21-25
26-35
36-50
51-60
61 or older
Unknown
Marital Status
Married
Divorced
Single
Widowed
Unknown
Safety Event
None
Preventable accident
Non-preventable accident
Traffic violation
Out-of-service inspection
Other
Experience
Late career stage (> 10 yrs)
Mid-career stage (> 2 yrs, <?
lOyrs)
Early career stage (<? 2 yrs)
Unknown
Company time
Extended (> 5 years)
Average (> 1 year,
5 years)
New (<? 1 year)
Unknown

1.0
29.3
55.6
13.1
0.0
1.0
70.7
10.1
16.2
1.0
2.0
Percent
59.6
19.2
11.1
5.1
2.0
3.0
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The drivers exhibit a broad range of experience
ranging from 0.33 to 40 years with an average
experience level of 13.6 years. Company tenure
ranges from “just started” to 14 years with an
average of 3.6 years with the company. The
majority of the drivers are in the mid to late
stages of their careers (i.e., > 10 years of
experience) and the company seems to employ
very few inexperienced drivers (i.e., < 2 years).
Additionally, the drivers are relatively new to
the company. Approximately 74% of the drivers
have worked for the company for five years or
less.

Semantic differential scales were adapted to
minimize socially desirable responding.
Risk Aversion was measured using a 5-item, 7point scale based on willingness to get involved
in non-specific risky situations. The (safety)
Self-Assessment construct asked drivers to
compare their personal safety performance to
the average commercial driver against a 7point scale. These were new constructs tested
for their interaction with the more traditional
Climate and TPB model constructs.

RESULTS
Measures
Safety climate and TPB scales were adapted
from previous literature (i.e. Zohar and Luria,
2005; Ajzen, 1991, 2002) and developed for the
specific needs of this study. Surveys were pilottested with both safety professionals and a
small group of drivers from a different
company before being used in this study.
Respondents voluntarily completed the survey
and were given token incentives (i.e., pens and
notepads) for participating.
Drivers’ perceptions of organizational safety
climate were measured using a 10-item, 7-point
(<disagree to agree) scale adapted from Zohar
and Luria (2005). Based on relevance to the
occupational context, six items were removed
from the original 16 item instrument. The TPB
constructs were measured with respect to
unsafe driving actions using 5-item, 7-point
scales, anchored by totally unacceptable to
fairly acceptable (Drivers’ Attitudes and
Subjective Norms), easy to avoid to hard to
avoid (Perceived Control), and very unlikely to
very likely (Behavioral Intentions) based on
Ajzen (2002).
Unsafe driving actions were identified in the
Large Truck Crash Causation (LTCC) Study
(USDOT, 2006) and consisted of the most
common driver actions or behavioral outcomes
that contributed to truck-caused accidents.
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Results are presented in two sections. First,
reliability analyses and correlations between
constructs are shown. The second section
includes the regression analyses used to
explore the relationships between the
attitudinal or perceptual constructs (as
independent variables) and the behavioral
intent construct as the dependent variable.
These results provide company safety
management with some statistical evidence of
the influences on drivers’ behavioral intentions
to commit unsafe driving actions.

Reliability and Correlation Analyses
Construct validity was performed using Factor
Analysis and measured with the Cronbach’s
Alpha. Some items were removed from the
proposed constructs after pilot testing and a
reassessment of face validity by the
researchers (see Appendix A, Survey
Instrument). One item was removed from the
Climate scale (regularity of safety awareness
events). All items remained in the self-assessed
safety performance items SA1-SA5, and risk
avoidance items RA1-RA5, as these were new
constructs to be investigated by the research in
an exploratory fashion. One item was dropped
from all TPB constructs (use of over the
counter medications). This item was originally
included due to its presence in the LTCC
study. However, as the remaining factors

(speeding, performing a prohibited maneuver,
and performing an improper lane change) were
all volitional driving actions and the use of
medication was not a volitional driving action,
it was dropped for relevance. The items related
to following too closely were not reliable
enough to include in the analysis. It is
proposed that for the type of congested
metropolitan driving performed by the WMV
drivers, this act was not as relevant as it would
be for long-haul drivers.
Factor Analysis was used to assess the
reliability of the constructs. The Climate
variables C1-C9 were found to be reliable
measures of safety climate and were included
in the climate factor. All five items were found
to be reliably related for both Self Assessed
safety performance and Risk Avoidance. The
TPB factors of Attitude (Al, 3, 4), Subjective
Norm (SN1, 3, 4), Perceived Control (PCI, 3, 4),

and Behavioral Intentions (BI1, 3, 4) were all
found to be reliable overall measures.
The metrics used to assess reliability are listed
on Table 2, with the Cronbach’s Alpha in the
diagonal where each factor is crossed with
itself. Values greater than 0.70 are generally
considered reliable (Nunnally, 1978). All of our
factors were considered to be reliable, ranging
from a low of 0.78 up to a high of 0.92 for the
factors. The validity of the exploratory
constructs Risk Aversion and Self Assessed
safety performance were both found to be
internally reliable.
Results of the correlation analysis are also
presented in Table 2. Correlations that were
significant at the 0.10 level or better are
indicated in bold; those better than the 0.01
level are bold and indicated with an asterisk.

TABLE 2
CORRELATIONS FOR KEY CONSTRUCTS

Variables

C

RA

Climate (C)

(.92)

Self Assessment (SA)

0.58*

(.89)

Risk Avoidance (RA)

0.38*

0.71*

(.78)

Attitude (ATT)

-0.05

-0.11

-0.18

(.84)

Subjective Norm (SN)

-0.17

-0.16

-0.18

0.58*

(.92)

Perceived Behavioral Control
(PC)

-0.01

-0.06

-0.11

0.43*

0.49*

(.89)

Behavioral Intentions (BI)

-0.06

-0.24*

-0.29*

0.49*

0.45*

0.53*

SA

ATT

SN

PC

BI

(-89)

^Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
Correlation is significant at the .10 level (2-tailed)
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Safety climate, self-assessed safety
performance, and risk avoidance are highly and
significantly related to each other. This finding
implies that drivers who rate themselves as
safer than other drivers are also likely to rate
the company’s safety climate higher. Those
drivers who tend to avoid risk in general are
also more likely to rate the company’s safety
climate higher. Finally, drivers who rate
themselves as safer than others are also more
likely to be risk averse.
Strong and significant relationships exist
among the TPB variables. Attitude, subjective
norm, and perceived behavioral control are all
positively related to behavioral intentions. This
finding is as expected. That is, drivers who find
unsafe actions more acceptable are likely to
have higher intentions to perform those
actions. Drivers who believe their friends,
family, and co-workers find certain unsafe
actions more acceptable are likely to have
higher intentions to commit those actions.
Finally, the less control drivers perceived they
have over performing unsafe actions, the
higher their intentions to commit those actions.
These findings will be discussed again in the
regression analysis.
Finally, self-assessed safety performance and
risk avoidance have a significant inverse
relationship with behavioral intentions. In
other words, drivers who assess their safety
performance as higher than others have lower
intentions to commit unsafe actions. Similarly,
drivers who are risk averse have lower
intentions to commit unsafe actions. Drivers’
perceptions of company safety climate are not
related to behavioral intentions.

Regression Analysis
Correlation analysis was followed by
regression analysis. The results are presented
in Tables 3 and 4. The Stepwise Regression
procedure was used first for all of the factors of
interest used in the study (C, SA, RA, ATT, SN,
and PC; Table 3). The technique was then
30
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applied to the Climate and TPB factors only (C,
ATT, SN, and PC; Table 4). In both cases the
factors were used to predict Behavioral
Intention (BI). The inclusion threshold was set
at a significance level of 0.10 or better.
When looking at all the factors, a few findings
were noteworthy (Table 3). Overall, the model
was very reliable (F Significance) and powerful
(adjusted R2). In contrast with the results of the
correlation analysis, self-assessed safety
performance and subjective norm were found to
provide little additional power in predicting
Behavioral Intention. Climate was not found to
be significant in either the correlation analysis
or the regression analysis.
In contrast, perceived behavioral control,
attitude, and risk aversion constructs have a
significant influence on behavioral intentions.
Drivers who perceived various unsafe driving
actions as more acceptable were more likely to
commit those actions in the future.
Furthermore, the harder it was for drivers to
control whether or not they performed unsafe
driving actions, the higher their intentions to
commit those actions in the future. Those
drivers who were generally more risk averse
(uncomfortable with risky situations) were also
less likely to consider performing the unsafe
acts.
When only the climate and TPB factors were
looked at, the results were a little different
(Table 4). This model was also very reliable (F
Significance) and powerful (adjusted R2;
slightly less than the “full” model). Contrary to
expectations, drivers’ subjective norms (how
people close to them felt about the drivers
performing unsafe actions) did not have a
significant effect on behavioral intentions. One
plausible explanation is that most drivers are
not regularly subject to the perceptions of close
friends and family while driving professionally.
The results may be different when driving their
personal vehicle. Furthermore, professional
drivers make numerous split second decisions,
and do not have the time to think about the

TABLE 3
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR KEY CONSTRUCTS (ALL
VARIABLES)
Variable

Behavioral Intent
Std Error
Sig

Intercept
Perceived Control
Attitude
Risk Aversion

3.020
.418
.308
-.308

F Significance (reliability)
Adjusted R2 (strength)

.000
.375

.001
.000
.002
.022

.852
.098
.096
.132

Entered those factors that were statistically significant at 0.10 or better

TABLE 4
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
FOR KEY CONSTRUCTS (TPB VARIABLES)
Variable

P
Intercept
Perceived Control
Attitude

1.223
.426
.341

F Significance (reliability)
Adjusted R2 (strength)

.000
.346

Behavioral Intent
Std Error
Sig
.001
.000
.001

.368
.100
.097

Entered those factors that were statistically significant at 0.10 or better
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Table 4
(continued)
Please tell us how much you disagree or agree with the following statements:

Top management in this company...
Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about a safety issue.
Provides all the equipment needed to do the job safely.
Is strict about driving safely even when deliveries fall behind schedule.
Quickly corrects any safety issue (even if it’s costly).
Provides detailed safety reports to employees (e.g., accidents, violations)
Invests a lot of time and money in safety training for drivers.
Listens carefully to employees’ ideas about improving safety.
Considers safety when setting delivery windows and schedules.
Provides employees with a lot of information on safety issues.
Regularly holds safety-awareness events (e.g., presentations,

Disagree
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Compared to the average commercial driver on the road, I . . .
Have a much better safety record.
Strictly follow all company safety policies and recommendations.
Set the example for others to follow in terms of safe practices.
Abide by all Federal, State, and Local safety regulations.
Have a much better track record for inspections and enforcement

Disagree
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3

Agree
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7

Compared to the average commercial driver on the road, I . . .
Am very cautious and approach risks carefully.
Tend to “sit things out” rather than take any chances.
Avoid putting myself in stressful situations.
Generally think things through quite a bit before acting.
Don’t like to get involved in new situations.

Disagree
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

Agree
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7

Agree
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7

Please give us your reaction to the following issues:

How acceptable is it to you personally to perform the following
actions while driving commercially:
Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas
Follow too closely
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.)
Perform an improper lane change
Use over the counter medication with a “Do not operate heavy
equipment” warning
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Totally
Acceptable
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

3
3
3
3
3

Fairly
Accept
able
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7

Table 4
(continued)
Fairly
Totally
How acceptable is it to people close to you (family, friends,
Accept
coworkers) that you perform the following actions while Unacceptable
driving commercially:
able
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Follow too closely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform an improper lane change
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use over the counter medication with a “Do not operate heavy
equipment” warning
How easy or hard is it for you to control whether or not you
perform the following actions while driving commercially (easy Very Easy Very Hard
to avoid/hard to avoid):
Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Follow too closely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.)
Perform an improper lane change
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use over the counter medication with a “Do not operate heavy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
equipment” warning
How likely is it that you will perform any of the following
Very
Very
actions, at least once or twice in the next month or so, while
Likely
Unlikely
driving commercially:
Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Follow too closely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform an improper lane change
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use over the counter medication with a “Do not operate heavy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
equipment” warning

perceptions of close friends and family. After
the event has happened, this would affect their
assessment of the role of those opinions on
their own attitudes. Finally, some drivers
might think that anything other than people’s
acceptance of their driving behavior is an
indication of people’s distrust of the driver to
make good decisions. Thus, the driver
dismisses others’ opinions unless the opinions
fit the driver’s attitudes (Forward, 2006).
Also surprising was the lack of effect from the
climate variable. Apparently, the drivers’
perception of the company safety climate did

not correspond closely to their expressed
behavioral intention. This was also supported
by the correlation analysis discussed earlier.
The most common explanation would be that if
the climate variable were excessively “noisy” (a
wide variation between answers on the climate
items for each driver) it would fail to be
accepted by the model due to reliability.
However, the reliability score of 0.92 (from
Table 2) would rule that explanation out. It
could be that the drivers had strong (reliably
consistent) opinions about the company safety
climate, their opinions were not associated
with their likelihood to commit an unsafe act.
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In other words, their intentions were
“indifferent” to how they perceived the safety
climate.

indirect effect on behavioral intentions by
influencing self-assessed safety skills and risk
aversion.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

More specifically, training can be used to relay
the potential consequences of safe and unsafe
actions. It seems that company management
does a great job conveying safety information to
drivers. However, operational policies may
counteract the effect of the information as was
indicated in drivers’ perceptions of safety
climate. In other words, drivers might view the
consequences of unsafe actions (i.e., speeding)
as related to gains rather than losses. Safety
training programs that focus on the positive
consequences of safe behavior are likely to
influence drivers’ attitudes towards safety and,
in turn, behavioral intentions (Forward, 2006).

This study provides important managerial
implications. The findings suggest that, in this
context, carrier management should focus on
influencing drivers’ attitudes towards and
perceived control over unsafe driving actions.
Also, screening of drivers for risk aversion may
be helpful in this regard as well. However,
studies have found that it is difficult to change
attitudes because they are deeply rooted.
Perhaps drivers’ perceptions of the value of
various safety practices may be used to inform
management of potential courses of action to
influence attitudes and perceived control.
Training and company support have
traditionally been considered important
influences of safe driving habits. Results from
previous studies have indicated that effective
training events may be a key to influencing
drivers’ attitudes. These events, however, must
solicit consistent, active involvement from
participants in classroom or interactive
computer-based settings (Elliot, Armitage, &
Baughn, 2005). Various types and venues of
training coupled with a training partnership
between drivers and carrier management may
be a key to influence drivers’ attitudes towards
safety (Mejza et al., 2003). This study found no
support for a direct link between safety climate
perceptions and behavioral intent; however,
evidence suggests that climate may have an
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Overall, more research is needed to determine
which practices have the most effect on
attitudes, perceived control, and behavioral
intentions. This study is a good first step to
identifying attitudes and perceived behavioral
control as important influences of drivers’
behavioral intentions to commit unsafe acts.
Narrowing down the most important influences
will get to the heart of the safety issue and
management will ultimately be able to
understand focus on the appropriate
influencing factors. Also, the contribution of
the new attitudinal constructs of risk aversion
and self-assessed safety performance merit
further investigation. Future research should
also consider a broader sample of drivers
working in different occupational contexts, as
well as a larger number of participants.
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